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The rapid growth of  rural nonstate industry  - a  sector of
community-based firns  - has been the most striking recent
economic phenomenon in China, next to the decollectivization
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Next to the decollectivization of agriculture, the  Community incentives for promoting TVPs
most striking economic transformation in China  are strong. But their community orientation
since 1978 has been the rapid growth of rural  leads to certain problems, resulting from the
nonstate industry.  fragmentation of markets for capital and labor
and the multiple, sometimes conflicting, roles of
Firms in this sector (referred to here as  community governments.
TVPs) are owned by a hierarchy of local govern-
ment units below the county level:  towns (or  Even if resources are used efficiently within
townships), villages, and production teams (or,  rural communities, the immobility of factors of
to a lesser extent, private individuals and  production can lead to increasingly serious
groups). TVPs owned by township or village  misallocations and inequalities between commu-
govemments (that is, not privately owned) are  nities.
termed TVCEs.
A gradual opening of capital and labor
Important both to industry and the rural  markets is a priority task in the next stage of
economy, TVPs have been at the forefront of  reform.  Weakening the involvcmentt  o0 commu-
economic reform.  They are market-eiriented  in  nity goverments  in management of rural
terms of output and input and, because of their  industrialization is likely to be gradual and take
tiny home markets, outward-oriented.  a long time. A stronger legal framework in
which TVCEs and private firms can operate will
There appears to be a close relationship  be needed.
between individual incomes and firm/commu-
nity economir performance.  Most individuals  National govemment policy should be to
expect to stay in their firms for relatively long  minimize discrimination by govemment, legal,
periods.  In some ways, TVPs seem to resemble  and regulatory apparatus against TVPs and,
the so-called Z firms, rather than private or state  within the TVP sector, against privatz enterprise.
enterprises.  The long-term goal should be elimination of dif-
ferential treatment.
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I.  Introduction.
Next  to  the  decollectivization  of  agriculture,  the  most  striking  economic
transformation  in  China  since  1978  has  been  the  rapid  growth  of rural  nonstate
industry. Firms  in this  sector  are  owned  by a hierarchy  of local  government
units below the county level--towns  (or townships,  as they are sometimes
called),  villages,  and in some  areas  production  teams--and  to a lesser  extent
by private  individuals  and groups. Rural  communities  in  China  exist  at three
levels:  the  township  (formerly  the  commune)  typically  has  15,000-30,000  people,
the  village  (formally  the  brigade)  typically  has  1,000-2,000,  and  the  production
team  about  100-200.  There  are  substantial  variations  in  size  and  economic  power
among  communities  in different  parts  of the country.  Reflecting  their  mix of
ownership,  these  firms  will  be referred  to  here  as TVPs  while  that  part  of the
TVP  sector  that  is  owned  by township  and  village  community  go-arnments  (that  is,
not privately  owned)  will be referred  to as township  and village  community
enterprises  (TVCEs).
China  had  attained  a  certain  degree  of  rural  industrialization  by the  late
1970s,  but this  occurred  within  the  confines  of  an administrative  straitjacket.
This  earlier  industrialization  has  been dwarfed  by the  burst  of activity  that
followed  the easing  of ideological  and political  prohibitions  against  rural
nonagricultural  activities after  1978.  Private  industrial and  other
nonagricultural  ("sideline")  activities  came  to  be permitted,  even  encouraged.
In 1987  limits  on the  size  of  private  firms,  which  had  been only  sporadically
enforced,  were lifted. Following  several  years  of spectacular  growth,  by 19872
TYPs acvounted  for  som  23  percent  of total  industrial  output  value  of Chinese
industry.  Some  rural  areas  that  only a  fey  years back had relied  almost
entirely  on  agriculture  have  become  overwhelmingly  industrial  communities,  with
agriculture  continuing  as a marginal  activity  subsidized  out of industrial
income.
Growth of the TVP sector  has been an important  component  of China's
reform,  and  has fitted  into the strategy  of developing  an economy  which is
partly  market-driven  and  partly  plan-driven.  Some  commodities  have  come to  be
largely  traded  at market  prices  while others  have seen a larger  or smaller
marketed  component  supplement  trade at controlled  prices.  Continued  state
ownership  of  major  industry  (with,  at the  same  time,  some  reforms  in  enterprise
management)  has  been  complemented  by  ownership  reforms  in  agriculture  and  growth
of a nonstate  industrial  sector.
What, then,  does the  growth  of the TVP sector  mean for China's  overall
reform? To what  extent  does  it represent  a  broadening  of the  market  mechanism
outside  agriculture  and  a potential  source  of competition  for  state  industry?
How coupatible  with a  market  economy  are the patterns  of incentives  for  TVP
owners,  managers  and workers?  Is the TVP sector  a proxy for a private
industrial  sector? Or is it just  an extension  of traditional  state  ownership
to  rural  industry?  What  are  the  regional  and  distributional  implications  of  TVP
development? This  paper  considers  these  questions,  drawing  on the  results  of
a  recent  collaborative  resenrch  project  between  the  World  Bank  and  the  Institute
of Economics  of the  Chinese  Academy  of Social  Sciences)l
The extent  and characteristics  of rural industrial  development  differ
greatly  among  China's  many  counties. The project  therefore  involved  in-depth
fieldwork  in  four  counties  selected  for  their  diversity  in  stage  of development3
and organizational  features. 2 As suggested  by the  data  in  Table  1,  two  of the
counties,  Wuxi and Nanhai,  are relatively  industrialized.  Wuxi, in Jiangsu
Province  near  Shanghai,  had  been the  most industrialized  rural  county  in  China
for  some time  and offers  a good example  of a "traditional"  system  of tightly
integrated  local  government-owned  firms. Neither  labor  nor land  markets  have
developed  in Wuxi, although  there  are elements  of a capital  market.  Nanhai
County,  situated  ir the  booming  coastal  province  of Guangdong  with its more
freewheeling  economy,  has also industrialized  rapidly  and has benefited  from
expanding  links  with foreign  business,  especially  through  Hong Kong.  Labor
markets  are  relatively  open,  and  a laissez-faire  attitude  prevails  on whether
firms  should  be owned  privately  or by local  go7ernments. Jieshou  County  in
Anhui  Province  represents  a more-or-less  aver-e level  of TVP development  for
China, but  its policies toward the sector are  unusual in that private
enterprises  have  been encouraged  and  even  sponsored  by local  governments.  An
active  land  market  has  developed,  as  have  "specialized  villages,"  a  new  mode  of
rural  industrial  development. 3 Shangrao  County  in  Jiangxi  province  represents
a level  of  TVP  development  below  the  national  average,  with "traditional,"  yet
unsuccessful,  management  of the  sector.
The fo,lowing  section  briefly  reviews  the rise of the TVP sector,  its
relationship  with  agricultural  reform,  and the  patterns  of labor  absorption  in
the sample  counties. The next section  considers  the  market  environment  for
TVPs--the  extent  to  which  these  firms  compete  on an  equal  basis  in  free  product
and factor  markets -- and summarizes  what is known of the efficiency  of
different  ownership  types. A look  at  the  incentives  for  owners  of  TVPs  follows
this  discussion.  As the  owners  are  mainly  various  levels  of local  governments,
an important  question  in judging  the significance  of the TVP sector  is the4
extent  to which such firms  wlll behave  differently  from those  owned by the
state.A  The research indicates  some important  difierences  between state
ownership  and ownership  by "small'  units  of government,  which suggests  that
looking  at the  TVP sector  as simply  another  form  of state  enterprise  is quite
misleading.  The  incentives  for  labor  and  patterns  of labor  payments  in the  TVP
sector  are considered  next.  The paper ends with a summary of the major
findings.
II.  The  Rise  of the  TVP  Sectgr.
The  development  of China's  TVP  sector  during  the  past  thirty  years  can  be
divided  into  several  phases. The  Great  Leap  Forward  of the  late  1950s  led to
the creation,  by local  governments,  of nuwarous  rural  small-scale  industrial
firms  but these  for  the  most  part  turned  out to  be unsustainable  for  a  variety
of  reasons  including  low  level  of  technology  and  inadequate  scale. As a  result,
the TIVP  sector  shrank  drastically  in the early 1960s.  A new wave of TVP
development  began in 1970, based on  the government's  desire to promote
production  of key inputs  for the mechanization  of agriculture  (agricultural
tools  and  implements, tractors, other  agricultural  machinery, chemical
fertilizer,  and the  like). But  this  development  spread  beyond  the limits  set
by government,  and  a few  parts  of the  country,  like  southern  Jiangsu  Province,
achieved  rural  industrialization  on a self-sustaining  basis.  The third  phase
of TVP development  has  been  an integral  part  of rural  and  agricultural  reforms
since  1978.
A.  The  Production  ResRonsibility  System
Agricultural  reforms  have  had  a major impact  on the  TVP sector. Prices
of farm products  were raised  substantially,  improving  agriculture's  terms  of5
trade. Mandatory  quotas  for  areas  planted,  o,rput,  and  compulsory  procurement
were either  eliminated  or reduced.  Most important,  in the early 1980s the
comune  system  gave way to the  production  responsibility  system,  under  which
most  coumunal  land  was  divided  equally  on  per  capita  or  per  worker  terms. 5 The
obligations  of households  were limited  to tax  payments,  procurement  quotas  at
set prices  and contributions  to social  funds.  As noted by Balassa (1987),
quotas  were often set in absolute  terms,  providing  a  strong inceLtive  for
increasing  production.
The response  to these reforms is well-documented. Although acreage
shifted  away  from  grain  production,  per  capita  grain  output  rose  and  overall  per
capita  gross  agricultural  output  grew  by two-thirds.  About  half the  increased
output  between  1978  and 1984  could  be attributed  to increased  inputs  and  half
to growth  of total  factor  productivity  (Johnson  1986 as presented  in Balassa
1987). Lin (1986)  found  that  growth  of output  was correlated  with the  extent
to  which  the  production  responsibility  system  was introduced.
China's rural communities  were profoundly  affected  by  the r'oduction
responsibility  system. A major.  consequence  was to  make  alparent  the  extent  of
surplus  rural labor  and so to generate  pressures  to address  the employment
problem.  With continuing  controls  on mobility (which  fore;tallcd  a major
population  shift  to urban  areas),  job  creation  in rural  areas  was needed  not
only  for  social  stability  but  to  enable  the  potential  productivity  gains  of the
production  responsibility  system  to be fully  realized.  At the sate time,
increased  rural incomes  boosted the demand  for consumer  goods and housing,
creating  markets  for  products  suitable  for  production  by smaller  firms,  while
rural  savings,  deposited  in the  local  banking  system,  offered  a growing  source6
of capital  to finance  industrial  investment. Demand  and supply  factors  thus
combined  to impel  rural  industrialization.
Incentiver  for  labor  and  potential  owners  of  industrial  firms  also  changed
markedly  after  1978.  Many TVPs  had previously  paid  wages directly  to worker
production  teams  and the  workers  had then  participated  in year-end  collective
inerme  distributions. This greatly  diluted  incentives. Even in enterprises
that  paid workers  directly,  fixed-time  wages  were usual. With the  productioa
responsibility  system,  which  led to the  abolition  of the system  of community
workpoints,  firms  could  shift  to direct,  performance-related  pay in a variety
of forms,  although,  as described  below,  the  income  of a community  still  has  an
important  influence in setting the terms of  these payments.  For local
governments,  the  benefits  of  owning  successful  industrial  firms  were  boosted  by
progressive  decentralization  of the  fiscal  system. In  areas  like  Wuxi  County,
the  response  to  this  confluence  of forces  was  to  further  promote  existing  local-
government-owned  industry; other localities  like Nanhai sought a  mix of
government  and  private  initiative;  and  still  other  places  turned  to primarily
private  enterprise-based  rural  industrialization.
B.  Output  Growth  in the  TVP  Sector
Between 1978 and 1987 the value of rural gross industrial  output is
estimated  to  have increased  at an annual  rate  of about  26 percent  (table  2).
For  comparison,  during  this time  the  price  level,  as measured  by the  consumer
price  index,  increased  by 5 percent  a year.  Gross  fixed  assets  of TVCEs  rosL
at  over  20  percent  a year  and  bank loans  to  TVCEs  at the  remarkable  rate  of  44
percent.  Fieldwork  suggests  that  early  profit  opportunities,  which  were  clearly
very  high from  estimates  of profits/sales,  were  progressively  whittled  away  by7
increased  comp.ti  ion within the TVP sector  (see the discussion  of markets
below).  This is confirmed  by aggregate  data,  which  show  profits  riwing  more
slowly  than  output,  assets,  and  wage  payments.
Employment  in rural nonagricultural  activities  rose s'-  rply in this
period,  from  22 million  in 1978  to 77  million  by 1986 (including  seasonal  and
part-time  workers).  Huch of this increase  was due to service  activities,
however,  and the industrial  TVP  sector  posted  more  modest  absolute  increases.
In the more advanced  localities,  in particular,  rural industrialization  has
accompanied  declines  in the agricultural  labor  force.  For example,  in  Wuxi
County  during  1978-85  the  industrial  labor  force  grew  by 19  percent  a  year  while
the  agricultural  force  declined  by 13 percent  a year.  Average  wages  paid  by
TVPs,  which  were initially  well  below  state-firm  levels,  rose  rapidly  but then
moderated  to  slightly  below  the  rate  of increase  in  the  state  sector. In  1978-
87,  the  average  real  TVP  wage rose  by almost  8 percent  a  year.
As a result  of rapid TVP growth,  the ownership  structure  of China's
industry  as a  whole  has  changed  markedly  (see  table  3).  The share  of the  TVP
sector  has increased  sharply,  from  only  3  percent  in  1971  to  over  23  percent  by
1987,  while  the  share  of  state  enterprises  has  declined  considernbly.  All  types
of TVPs  have seen  an increase  in their  share,  but i.owth  has  been most  marked
for  firms  owned  by  private  individuals  and  private  groups  of  individuals.  There
has been a corresponding  shift in the composition  of rural gross output.
Whereas  in 1978 crop cultivation  represented  53  percent  and industry  only 19
percent  of output,  by 1987 the share  of crop cultivation  had fallen  to 30
percent  while that of industry  had risen  to 35 percent.  Smaller  gains  were
posted  by  other  farming  activities  and  by  construction,  transport,  and  commerce.8
The  share  of  TVPs  i1i  the  output  of specific  industries  or product  groups
varies  greatly,  although  they  were  active  in virtually  all broad industrial
lines  by 1985. Considering  only  TVCEs  (there  are  no  corresponding  data  for  all
TVPs) shows  that in 1985 they  accounted  for  26 percent  of the gross  value  of
industrial  production  in  machine  building,  19  percent  in  construction  materials,
and  13  percent  in  textiles.  They  produced  some  80  percent  of  all  bricks,  almost
20 percent  of cement,  and nearly  25 percent  of paper and cardboard  made in
China.
III. Markets  and  Administrative  Structure.
A.  The  Market  Environment  of the  TVPs
Does the rise of the TVP sector  represent  a strengthening  of market
forces? Or do TVPs,  like  their  state  counterparts,  operate  largely  according
to  mandatory  or "guidance"  plans? Insofar  as they  are  market  based,  are  their
markets fragmented  by  "local  protectionism"  policies implemented  by  local
governments,  or are  their  markets  regional  or  national?
The answers  to these  questions  differ  for product  and factor  markets.
Surveys  provide  ample  evidence  that  planned  output  as a share  of total  output
is  minimal  for  most  TVPs. Furthermore,  they  are  "outward  oriented"  with  respect
to their  home communities,  as might  be expected  given the  very small  size  of
their "home markets.  "  For example, in Wuxi only 4 p--cent of sales of
industrial  TVCEs  occurred  within  the  home township  in 1985.  Large  majorities
of sampled  firms  in  all  four  counties  sold  at least  40 percent  of their  output
outside  the  home  province. In  any  case,  communal  governments  have  little  scope
for  protecting  their  enterprises  from  outside  competition. The surveyed  TVPs9
also rely  heavily  on the  market  mechanism  for intermediate  inputs,  with the
partial  exception  of electric  power.
On  the  factor  side,  however,  the  TVP  sector  is  heavily  community  oriented.
All firms (including  private enterprises)  must obtain land and  financial
capital  (usually  in  the  form  of  bank loans)  through  the  good  offices  of their
local  governments.'  Although  a  labor  market  is  emerging  in  some  areas,  notably
Guangdong  Province,  labor  allocation  through  local  governments  still  takes  place
in many localities.  In particular,  technically  skilled labor tends to be
allocated  by govermients,  rather  than  bid for  by potential  employers.  Except
for  labor  in  some  areas,  TVPs  in  different  localities  therefore  do  not  generally
compete  for  factors  on the  basis  of price.
The  efficiency  of the  TVP  sector  therefore  depends  both  on the  efficiency
of factor  allocation  within  individual  localities  and on the degree  to which
locking  productive  factors  into  small  administrative  units  induces  misallocation
of resources  betwee  localities. The first  issue  is closeiy  related  to the
incentives  faced  by TVP  owners,  managers,  and  employees.9  Extensive  treatment
of the  second  issue  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  brief  coverage  of  TVPs  but it
could be noted that decisions  on location  and scale of TVPs appear to be
seriously,  and sometimes  adversely,  affected  by the dis,ersion  of ownership
across communities  and by  the  limited scope of  joint ventures between
communities. Small  communities  also face increased  risk from concentrating
their  resources  in  one  or two  large  firms. 10
Overall,  t1.ere  is considerable  anecdotal  and statistical  evidence  that
the  TVP  soctor's market environment  and  orientation lead to  efficient
performance  by Chinese  standards. In many industries,  TVPs outcompete  state
enterprises  or at least  hold their  own.  Production  function  estimates  (both10
Cobb-Douglas  and trenslog)  for sample enterprises  suggest that TVPs have
experienced  rapid  technical  progress  (or  improvement  in  X-efficiency)  over  time
and that they operate under increasing  returns to scale.  Interestingly,
productive  efficiency  does not seem to vary systematically  with type of
ownership  (Svejnar  1990). This  suggests  that  their  general  market  orientation
and the community  ties common to nearly all TVPs dominate  any impact of
different  forms  of ownership.
B.  Local  Government  and  Enterprise  Hierarchies
With  property rights still undeveloped in  China, some  degree of
association  between  the  bureaucratic  stat  s of the  owners  of an  enterprise  and
the status  of the firm is not surprising. By and large,  there is little
discrimination  against  local  TVCEs  by county  governments,  as they  have  a  strong
interest in promoting local industrialization,  but  at higher levels of
government  unfavorable  policies  such as abrupt curtailment  of credit have
sometimes  been imposed.  11  Within  the  hierarchy  of local  governments,  there  is
often some degree  of favoritism  for enterprises  owned  by the corresponding
government  unit,  because  of the  strength  of  fiscal  and  other  ties. Considerable
rivalry  may  exist  between  local  governments  at similar  levels.
Lowest on  the bureaucratic  totem pole are, of course, the private
enterprises.  Competition  for  technically  %nd  administratively  skilled  personnel
is  normally  the  most  severe  source  of conflict  between  private  firms  and local
TVCEs,  especially  where,  as in  Wuxi,  local  governments  seek  to  closely  regulate
firms  and  their  pay  scales. As  noted  below,  technically  skilled  labor  tends  to
be allocated  by governments  within  the  TVCE sector,  and this creates  tension
with  the  emerging  labor  market. The  formation  of  private  firms  and  their  entry11
into  specified  lines  of activity  can  be restricted  in many  ways,  for  example,
through  regulations  on energy  use, zoning,  and sancticns  on skilled  workers
wanting  to  leave  TVCEs  for  private  firms. The  extent  to  which  private  firms  are
encouraged  or  discouraged  varies  widely  among  localities,  reflecting  differences
in the extent  to which traditional  community-owned  firms  are protected  from
private  sector  competition.  But  even  in  areas  supportive  of  private  enterprise,
such  as  Jieshou,  the  weakness  of  property  rights  can  lead  to  numerous  problems.
These may  include  'collectivization"  of private firms under pressure  from
workers  and local  authorities. There  may also  be more voluntary  changes  of
ownership where  the  original proprietors exchange ownership rights for
management contracts and  improved administrative  status  which  carries
priviledges  such as food allowances  for them and their descendents. These
exchanges  would,  of  course,  be less  attractive  with  a system  of  secure  property
rights.
IV.  Incentives  for  TVP  Owners.
A.  The ImRlications  for  Soatial  Ineguality
Most of China's  rural  population  is rooted  in fairly  small  communities
with little  prospect  for  permanent  migration,  although  seasonal  or temporary
labor  flows  are somewhat  more  common. Financial  resources  raised  from  within
a community  are  seen  as a local  resource,  and  intercommunity  flows  are limited
by a 'gap"  system  of credit  allocation  and  the  determination  of leaders  to  use
local funds for local investments. 12 Under these conditions,  substantial
inequalities  in factor  rewards,  especially  personal  incomes,  might  be expected
between  communities.12
Evidence  on the  dispersion  of personal  incomes  in  China  (Wuxi  and  Jieshou
being at very  different  levels of development)  and the United States is
presented  in  table  4.  While  urban  incomes  in  Chtna  are  distributed  relatively
evenly,  the  dispersion  of rural  incomes  among  provinces  is  markedly  larger  than
the dispersion  of average  incomes  across  U.S. states. A similar  pattern  is
evident for dispersion  of average incomes  among counties  within individual
provinces  or among  states.
The  level  of  TVP  development  is  probably  the  primary  determinant  of rural
per  capita  incomes  in  China;  in  1985,  the  correlation  between  the  value  of rural
industrial  output  per  head  and  average  income  per  head  across  China's  provinces
was  0.91.
Income  inequality  within  Chinese  colunties,  however,  is  usually  much  lower
than  inequalities  among  counties.  For  example,  in  Nanhai  County  the  coefficient
of variation  of income  per  head among  districts  was  only 7 percent  in 1985.13
And within  districts  and smaller  administrative  units,  a range of measures,
including  compensating  payments  made to  agriculture  out  of industrial  profits,
acts  to keep income  inequality  within  a fairly  narrow  range  (as  is shown  also
by the  wage equations  discussed  below). China  may thus  be characterized  as a
"locally  equal"  society  with substantial  regional  differences.
Among the four sample  counties,  the degree of spatial inequality  is
striking  (see  table  5). Average  per  capita  income  in  Nanhai  county  is  3.6  times
that  in  Jieshou. The  per  capita  wage  bill  of  TVCEs  in  Wuxi  is  28 times  that  in
Jieshou.  TVCE  profits  are  even  more  unevenly  distributed.  These  patterns  point
to the uneven  pace of rural industrial  development  across China (Wuxi  and
Jieshou  being  at different  levels  of development)  and  the  effect  of low labor
mobility.13
An interesting  question  is the  extent  to  which  greater  capital  mobility
could  compensate  for labor  immobility. There  are  some examples  of TVP firms
relocating  to poorer  regions  in response  to lower  labor  costs.  Balance  sheet
analysis  confirms  that  rents  in the  TVP  sector  have  indeed  fallen  with greater
competition  in  product  markets,  and  this  process  will  progressively  moderate  the
gains  of the  initial  entrants. However,  such  processes  are  likely  to  be slow,
partly  because  of the importance  of personal  connections  in establishing  and
operating  businesses. In the meantime,  the large  rural inequalities,  which
appear  to  have  widened  with industrialization,  are likely  to continue.
The degree  of inequality  may seem especially  surprising  given China's
strong  ideological  commitment  to equality  and the powerful  redistributional
instruments  available  to  the  state. But  whereas  government  can  exert  a strong
influence  over urban  wages and incomes,  it has no comparable  instrument  for
equalizing  rural  incomes  although,  as  noted  below,  some  redistribution  does  take
place  through  the  fiscal  system.
B.  Incentives  for  Owners  of TVPs
Without  the  deep  involvement  of  community  government  leaders,  China's  TVP
sector  could  not hava grown  nearly  as rapidly  as it  has.  The incentives  for
government  leaders  to establish  and promote local industries  are therefore
crucial  for  an understanding  of the  characteristics  of the  sector. Following
the  approach  of public  choice  theory,  local  governments  and individual  public
decisionmakers  are considered  here as self-interested  entities  whose actions
are  geared  toward  maximizing  their  own  benefits." This involves  analyzing  the
role  of  TVPs  in  their  communities  and  the  incentives  for  developing  TVPs  and  for
using  them  to support  other  goals.14
Fiscal Linkages  and  Discretionary  Povers.  China's prereform  highly
centralized  public  finance  system  dated  back to 1950.  While  even under  this
system certain extrabudgetary  funds were  mobilized and  used  by  local
governments,  extrabudgetary  funds  in  China  as a whole in 1953  were equivalent
to  only  4  percent  of the  state  budget. This  proportion  rose  to  over  35  percent
by 1977,  but  it  was  not  until  1980  that  China  began  to  decentralize  actively  and
to offer  more financial  autonomy  to local  governments  and  state  enterprises.
By 1985  extrabudgetary  funds  were  equivalent  to  85  percent  of  the  state  budget.
In  many  rural  communities,  especially  the  more  advanced  ones,  TVP  industry
has  become  the  primary  source  of  extrabudgetary  funds,  which  are  in  the  form  of
profit remittances  and management fees paid by  the  firms to the  local
government.  In  Nanhai  and  Wuxi  counties,  industry  provided  100  percent  of these
resources  in the mid-1980s;  even in Jieshou it provided  73 percent  and in
Shangrao  51  percent  despite  their  low  levels  of industrial  development.
For  local  governments,  access  to  extrabudgetary  funds  is  important.  These
funds represent their only substantial  source of  fiscal autonomy, since
budgetary  funds  are  mostly  earmarked  for specified  expenses,  notably  salaries
and  administrative  costs. In  some  respects,  local  governments  ir.  China  resemble
ministates  because  of their  stable  population  bases.  Yet they face  important
limitations  on  their  powers. Deficit  financing  by any  level  of  local  government
is not permitted,  and they do not have the right to establish  any new tax
instruments  or  set  tax  rates. Co-munity  governments  therefore  face  a  relatively
"hard"  budget  constraint.
Township  governments now  can  typically retain  for  their  own
discretionary  use a portion  of above-quota  tax revenues  collected  in their15
communities,  which allows them to tap into part of the budgetary revenue
generated  by TVP  development.  Townships  can  retain  8-12  percent  of  above-quota
tax  collections  in  Wuxi,  20  percent  in  Nanhai,  and  50-100  percent  in  Shangrao.
The quotas themselves  are increasingly  set according  to a fixed percentage
increase  from  some  baseline  level.
Typical financial  flows  among township  firms and township  and county
institutions  are shown  in figure  1.  Township  firms  pay direct  and indirect
taxes  to the town'nip. They pay management  fees (actually  a tax) to their
supervisory  agency,  the  township  industrial  corporation,  which  is  best thought
of as a community  holding  company  under  the  direction  of a township  economic
commission. Part  of their  after-tax  profits  is reinvested  and part is turned
over  to  the  township industrial  corporation.  The  township industrial
corporation  constitutes  an important  source  of funding  for  government  salaries
and  overhead,  discretionary  spending,  and  reinvestment  in  other  township  firms.
It  allocates  these  reinvested  funds  between  firms  (in  our  sample,  investment  by
township  governments  accounted  for  more than  30 percent  of start-up  funds  for
township  enterprises). The township  investment  corporation  also assumes  the
debts  of failing  township  firms  and  reallocates  them  to  healthy  firms  to  ensure
their  continued  service.  15
A Tale of Two Townships. To illustrate  the disparity  in the  degree  of
development  among China's  rural communities,  comparative  statistics  for two
townships  are  presented  in table  6.  Township  A is the  most industrialized  in
Wuxi. Township  B, in  Shangrao  Province,  is  one  of the  poorest  townships  visited
during  fieldwork;  it has an ave--age  per capita income  one-seventh  that of
Township  A.  Most  of this  disparity  is  due to  differences  in industrial  output16
per head.  The  most astonishing  differences  are  in local revenues and
expenditures  per  head,  which  in  Township  A exceed  those  in  Township  B  by a  vast
margin.
A breakdown  of resource  generation  and  us^  between  the two  townships  is
shown  in  table  7.  In  Township  A, the  vast  bulk  of tax  revenues  is  remitted  to
the county,  whereas  very little  is in poorer Township  B, which receives  a
supplemental  allocation  from  the  county  budget. Nevertheless,  remittances  from
enterprises  in To#a-shir  A  dwarf all budgetary  allocations.  16  The major
differences  between  townships  in  government  spending  are  also  shown  in  table  7.
In  Township  A,  almost  70  percent  of  expenditures  are  plowed  back  into  industrial
investment,  whereas  in  Township  B, 86  percent  are  used for  services  and
administrative  expenditures.  Nevertheless,  the  amount  spent  on services  and
administration  is  greater  in  Township  A, and  the  autonomy  of its  government  is
far  greater  since  almost  all  its  resources  are  extrabudgetary.  This  ability  to
increase  the  autonomy  of  local  government  appears  to  be one  important  motive  for
such  governments  to  promote  TVPs.LT
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Rewards  to  Community  Government  Officials.  The  personal  rewards  and
career prospects of  co-munity officials also depend greatly on  income,
employment,  and  revenue  mobilization  in their  communities.  These  personal
benefits  can  be  divided  into  two  types:  pay,  bonuses,  and  informal  earnings,  and
prospects  for  promotion.
Pay.  bonuses.  and  earnings  of community  leaders  and  factory  directors  in
TVCEs  vary significantly  across  communities  with  the  average  level  of incomes
and  TVP  development  in their  communities.  This  variation  tends  to  be greater
for  villages  and  production  teams  than for townships. In contrast,  socially
acceptable  limits  to pay differentials  appiar to exist within  communities,
although  these  may  be fuzzy  and  change  over  time.
In  Wuxi,  the  pay  of a factory  director  is  generally  limited  to twice  the
average  pay  of the  factory  employees. Pay  and  supplements  for  village  leaders
are also  about  twice  average  pay levels  in  village  factories. Workers'  wages
are  linked to enterprise profits (as described below), so  there  is a
relationship  between enterprise  profitability  and the income of community
leaders.
In Nanhai,  leaders'  pay is typically  two to three  times  average  income
per  worker  at the  town  and  village  levels  in their  community. In  one  township,
government  leaders  earned  about  Yuan (Y)  2,500  per year,  whereas  incomes  for
village  leaders  ranged  from  Y2,000  to Y6,000  per  year  and appear  to be linked
directly  to the profits  of "their"  enterprises. In some cases,  such as in
Xiqiao  town,  detailed  incentive  pay schemes  have  been  promulgated  for leaders
of subordinate  villages. With  an annual  base  pay  for  a  village  leader  of only
Y660," the possibility  of earning  up to Yl,100  for meeting  various  economic
targets  and Y10,000  or even  more on the  basis  of enterprise  profits  created19
strong  incentives  for  village  leaders  in  Xlqiao  to  develop  community  enterprises
and  operate  them  profitably.  The  top  pay  of  village  leaders  in  Nanhai  appeared
to be about  Y15,000 (some  thirty  tlmes  the typical  wage in Shangrao),  in a
village  where  workers  received  about  Y5,000  per  year.
In  Jieshou,  owners  of private  firms  (who  are  also  managers)  appear  to  be
abie  to  earn  high salaries  only  by paying  their  workers  much  higher  wages  than
warranted  by local  labor  market  conditions. In Shangrao  there is also some
linkage  between  local  income  levels  and  leaders'  pay,  but  the  incentive  effects
seem  to be weaker because of the low general level of  incomes and  the
consequently  greater  influence  of state  wage scales  for  officials  down to the
township  level.  Given  the  poor record  of profitability  of TVPs in Shangrao,
there  appears  to be very little  relationship  between  the  performance  of firms
and  rewards  to their  directors.
It is impossible  to gauge the magnitude  of informal  incomes  with any
precision,  but rewards  of this type  are typically  an important  part of total
compensation. More common  than outright  bribery  is consumption  of community
government  or enterprise  resources,  from cigarettes  to banquets  to housing
construction.  Since more funds,  especially  more discretionary  funds,  are
available  in  richer  areas,  leaders  undoubtedly  have  an  additional  incentive  for
stimulating  TVP  development.
The interaction  of national  pay scales  with sharp  differences  in local
income levels causes promotion and  career incentives to  operate quite
differentlv  in  different  parts  of  China. In  rich  areas  such  as  Wuxi  and  Nanhai,
successful  community  leaders  are  generally  unwilling  to be promoted  to higher
levels  because  of the greater  importance  of the  national  wage scale  at those
levels  and prohibitions  against township-level  officials  being involved  in20
business on their own account.  In the poor, backward areas, promotion
incentives  are far  more potent. Not only is there  little  loss  of income  for
promoted  leaders,  but the change in household  residency  status for those
promoted  to township  or county  level  is  of inestimable  value. 18 In  Jieshou  and
Shangrao,  lower-level  leaders  actively  strive  for  promotion. The  criteria  for
p-.amotion  are  undoubtedly  subjective,  but it  is clear  that  at least  since  1980
the  economic  performance  of the  community  for  which  the  leader  is responsible
has  carried  great  weight.
Immediate  financial  incentives  and  career  incentives  therefore  appear  to
complement  each other,  with financial  incentives  being  more powerful  in rich
areas  and  career  incentives  more  powerful  in poor  areas.  Fieldwork  indicates
that,  despite these  differences  in the mix of incentives,  under almost  any
circumstances  local  leaders  have had strong  personal  as well as bureaucratic
incentives  to develop  a successful  TVP sector  of some  kind.  This is broadly
true,  even  where  TVP  development  has lagged  or failed. Thus the  main factors
that  determine  the success  of development  must be sought  in the  patterns  of
constraints  facing  local  leaders  and  the  interaction  of these  constraints  with
the  incentive  structure.
C.  The  Dual  Roles  of Community  Governments
Local  governments  play  a  dual  role  in industrial  development,  being  both
owners  of firms  and administrators  of the  local  community. This can lead  to
tensions  and  inefficiencies  in  the  operation  of  the  TVCE  sectcr,  as  well  as  bias
against  private  enterprises.  In  certain  cases,  it  can  cause  the  set  of  linkages
between enterprises  and governments,  described above as having favorable
incentive  effects,  to operate  perversely. In this situation,  which is more21
likely  in  poorer  areas,  local  governments  can  become  an impediment  to  successful
industrialization  rather  than a powerful  force in its favor.  We term this
condition, wherein government excessively  exploits local  firms, "fiscal
predation."
The  household  responsibility  system  radically  altered  the  composition  of
property  under  the  control  of  local  governments.  Agriculture,  and  the  community
population  as a whole,  became  much less exposed  to fiscal  predation,  leaving
industry  as the only major source  of financing  for nonbudgetary  spending.
Especially  in the more advanced  areas, governments  underwent  a successful
transition  from  landlords  to industrialists.  But  where  enterprise  development
has  not  reiched  a  self-sustaining  stage,  community  governments  have  been  tempted
-- in some  cases  even impelled  by the inelasticity  of basic services  expected
from local  government--to  extract  funds  from  and through  their  enterprises  to
support their own consumption  expenditures.  Funds are levied from TVCEs
regardless  of their financial  performance.  Loss-making  firms meet these
requirements  by transferring  their  depreciation  funds  (in  effect  "eating"  their
capital  stock)  or by additional  borrowing,  which  means  that local  governments
are  indirectly  using  the  banking  system  to  finance  their  deficits.  Such  was  the
case  in Shangrao,  where  payments  from  the  enterprises  to local  government  (see
table  7) took  place  despite  very  poor  financial  performance  by firms.
Instances  of  "political"  interference  in the operation  of community
enterprises  seem  to  be fairly  widespread  in  rich  areas. In  Wuxi,  for  example,
many enterprise  directors  admitted  that their  enterprises  were overstaffed,
occasionally  by margins  as  high  as 50  percent,  and  firms  are  often  required  to
pay  various  expenses,  including  entertainment  of guests,  on  behalf  of the  local
government. 1 9  Nevertheless,  the  conflict  between  the  two roles  of community22
government  is  far  more severe  in  poor areas,  and this  poses  the  issuie  of how
rapidly  the  benefits  of rural  industrial  development  can  be expected  to  diffuse
under  a policy  of local  self-reliance.
The  independence  of the  banking  system  from  local  pressures  in  China  and
clear  property  rights  (including  accountability  for losses)  will  be important
in  maintaining  a tight  budget  constraint  for  local  communities  and  holding  the
TVP  sector  to  market-based  behavior. 20 Although  the  problem  of  predation  is  most
severe  for  poor areas that seek to use their  enterprises  to borrow  from the
banking  system  to fund current  expenses,  it could spread  to more prosperous
areas  should  China  experience  a  major  economic  downturn.
V.  Labor  Markets  and  Incentives.
A.  Labor  Markets  for  Rural  Industrv
Labor  markets  are still  fragmented  in China,  with significant  obstacles
to  both  rural-urban  and  rural-rural  migration. The  extent  to  which  development
of the  TVP sector  is contributing  to a loosening  of the labor  market  and  the
extent  to which rural firms  face a reasonably  competitive  labor  market  are
important  issues  in  assessing  the  incentives  for  participants  in ,he  sector  and
the  sector's  place  in  economic  reform.
Some indication  of the  mobility  of labor  in the four  sample  counties  is
provided  by data on the original  homes of employees  in sampled  enterprises
(table  8).  The  most  striking  contrast  is  between  the  two  advanced  areas,  Wuxi
and  Nanhai. In  Wuxi,  very  few  employees  come  from  outside  the  towns  or  villages
of their current employment;  in Nanhai,  almost  half came from outside the
community  and 15 percent  came from other counties  or provinces.  This is
especially  striking  since  Wuxi  County  is  considered  to  have  a  scarcity  of labor,23
to  the point of being  reflected in  an  increasing  capital intensity of
production. The situation  in the two less developed  counties,  Jieshou  and
Shangiao,  lies  somewhere  between  these  two  extremes.
This indication  that  Wuxi and Nanhai  represent  opposite  points in the
spectrum  of rural  labor  markets  is  reinforced  by other  survey  information.  TVP
industry  in  Wuxi relies  almost  entirely  on  workers  who describe  themselves  as
"permatient"  whereas  this  category  represents  only  40 percent  of employees  in
Nanhai,  76  percent  in  Jieshou  and  79  percent  in  Shangrao.  Further,  great  shifts
have taken  place in the relative  shares  of permanent  and "casual'  workers  in
Nanhai, indicating  major changes in  the operation of  the labor market.
Permanent  workers  represented  92 percent  of the total  in 1980,  76 percent  in
1983,  and  only  40  percent  in  1985. Nanhai  workers  are  more  mobile  than  workers
in  Wuxi:  27  percent  plan to leave  their  firm  within  three  years  and,  probably
because  of this,  there  is far  stronger  pressure  to distribute  profits  to the
work force  as opposed  to reinvesting  them.  Indeed,  as noted  below,  pay is
higher  in  Nanhai  TVP  industry  relative  to  Wuxi,  essentially  because  the  presence
of a substantial  private  sector  forces  government  industries  to compete  for
labor.
Are workers  allocated  to their  firms,  or are they  hired in a voluntary
manner?  Given the limits on choice due to population immo6ility,  this
distinction  can  be difficult  to  make  very  rigorously,  but  a  breakdown  was  made
of recruitment  according  to various  modes that  correspond  reasonably  well to
these  concepts  (table  9).  Voluntary  hiring  is most prevalent  in Nanhai  and
Jieshou and lowest  in Wuxi.  Older employees  are more likely  to have been
allocated  to their  firms,  and  so, interestingly,  are  the  higher-paid  workers.24
Labor  mobillty  and  earnings  distribution  within  local  industry  both  appear
to  be  heavily  influenced  by the  presence  of private  enterprises.
Few  workers  are  allocated  to private  firms,  and in  booming,  labor-short  areas
such as Nanhai private enterprises  provide a  source of competition  for
government-owned  TVCEs  that  is  absent  in  the  more  tightly  regulated  Wuxi  model.
Thus,  in 1985  average  inicome  in  sample  firms  was  higher  in  Nanhai  than in  Wuxi
and the  dispersion  of income  was significantly  greater.  In a poor, labor-
surplus  county  like  Jieshou,  however,  the  existence  of an active  labor  market
has  much less  effect  in  boosting  workers'  incomes.
With  respect  to  labor  dismissals,  the  survey  found  that  most  TVP  employees
have a fairly  long time-horizon  for  employment  with their  firms:  75 percent
plan  to  stay  witn their  firms  for  at  least  five  years  and,  possibly  because  the
bulk of them are first-generation  industrial  workers, most appear to be
basically  content  in  their  firms.  As  described  below,  TVP  firms,  whether  public
or  private,  appear  to  have  some  "communal"  characteristics  that  distinguish  them
from  most  firms  in  advanced  market  economies. Nevertheless,  enterprises  whose
directors  claimed to have the power to dismiss employees  accounted  for 97
percent  of  all  directors  surveyed  in  Jieshou,  82  percent  in  Wuxi,  73  percent  in
Nanhai,  and  68 percent  in Shangrao. The actual  number  of employees  dismissed
from  their  positions  for  any reason  was  extremely  small  in all  four  counties,
however,  and it  was  clear,  especially  in  Wuxi  and Shangrao,  that  the  power  to
dismiss  employees  was severely  curtailed  by l.ocal  community  governments. In
labor-surplus Shangrao, such  intervention in  labor  markets  is  more
understandable  than  in labor-scarce  Wuxi.25
B.  Incentive.  and  Pay  in  TVPs
Pay  systems  differ  considerably  among  TVPs,  and  those  in  the  more  advanced
counties  tend  to  be more  complex. Surveys  show  that  time  rates  are  not  the  main
method  of payment  for  most workers.  Piece  rates  are common,  and  bonuses  are
important  for  all  but 19  percent  of the  sample. Whatever  the  specific  form  of
payment,  however, employees  across  all  counties  and types  of firm  perceive  a
clear  relationship  between  their  incomes  and  the  profitability  of their  firms;
only 10 percent  see  no such  relationship  while  71 percent  consider  it to  be a
strong  one.  There  was  also evidence  of considerable  willingness  of employees
to  buy  stock  in their  firms,  should  this  become  possible.
Despite  the  wide distribution  of income  levels  reported  by the sample,
only  2  percent  of  respondents  described  their  incomes  as  high  relative  to  levels
in  their  community  and  only  9  percent  saw  them  as low. Furthermore,  there  was
no systematic  relationship  between  incomes  and  perceptions  of relative  level.
This suggests  that  pay in  TVPs tends  to  be set largely  with reference  to the
general  income  levels  in their  respective  communities.  TVPs  thus  have some  of
the characteristics  of cooperative  firms,  although  survey results indicate
clearly  that  they  are  far  from  worker-managed. 21 There  is  surprisingly  little
difference between public and  private firms  in  terms  of  reported pay
differences,  pay  differentials,  labor  relations,  and  similar  variabies,  except
that  private  firms  tend  to  be smaller  and simpler  and to  have fewer  technical
or  highly  skilled  workers.
The variables  that determine  pay  may be considered  in several  classes.
County  dummy  variables  can  be  used  to  represent  the  stage  of  development  of  the
area,  while  ownership  dummy  variables  can  represent  ownership  of the  firm. If
the firm itself  is seen as closely  identified  with a community,  firm dummy26
variables  can  be used instead. Other  firm  characteristics  are  size (number  of
employees)  and profitability  (measured  as a ratio of profits to sales).
Individual  variables  include  age (or  experience),  gender,  number  of workdays,
occupation,  and  education.
A variety  of statistical  models  was fitted  to the  data to explain  log
(pay)  using  the  sample  of 1,172  workers. County  dummy  variables  alone  account
for 30 percent  of pay variance,  and introduction  of a simple  public-private
ownership dummy adds little to this.  Profitability  of  the firm enters
significantly,  and  with  the  expected  positive  sign. Using  firm  dummy  variables
alone  results  in an R2 adjusted  for degrees  of freedom  of 0.57.  Much of the
observed  dispersion  of  pay  can  therefore  be  accounted  for  by  differences  between
firms.  Moreover,  nonparametric  statistical  tests suggest  that average  pay
levels  in firms  rank positively  with labor  force  growth,  output  growth,  and
growth  of output  value  per  worker. They thus  arise  from  the "pull"  effect  of
labor  productivity  gains  in the  more  dynamic  firms  in the  presence  of slowly
responding  labor  markets.
Adding  firm size,  profitability,  and individual  variables  to the  model
with firm dummy  variables  boosts  the  adjusted  R 2 to 0.70.  Women receive  14
percent lower pay than men, and apprentices  receive  26 percent less than
ordinary  workers;  group  leaders  and technical  staff  receive  between  10 and  40
percent  more.  The  effect  of adding  in  an education  variable  is surprising,  in
that  it indicates  that  employees  with some  college  education  receive  lower  pay
than  would  be expected  on  the  basis  of  other  variables. In  this  connection,  it
is interesting  to note that  highly  skilled  employees  are  more likely  to have
been  allocated  to their  firms  and  that  the  few  college  graduates  in the  sample
are  by far  the  most  likely  to  want  to  leave  their  firms. This  suggests  that  the27
market  for  human  skills  has not  yet  opened  up for  TVPs.  Indeed,  this  is true
of China as  a  whole,  and examples  encountered  during fieldwork  showed  many
ingenious  ways in  which  firms  sought  to get  around  the  problem  of the  missing
markets  for  technological,  management,  and  marketing  knowhow.
VI.  Conclusions.
Combining  elements  of  public  and  private  enterprise,  China's  dynamic  TVP
sector  has  become  an important  part  of the  country's  rural  economy  as well  as
a  major  actor  in  industry.  TVPs  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  economic  reforms.
They are essentially  market  oriented  on the output  and material  input  sides;
moreover,  they are outward  oriented  because  of the tiny size of their  home
markets.  TVPs  represent  an  increasingly  important  source  of  competition  for  the
state sector,  while the potential  for economically  beneficial  interactions
between  the  two  (for  example  subcontracting)  is  also  great.
This paper has highlighted  some of the distinctive  characteristics  of
TVPs,  which  are  related  primarily  to  their  close  ties  to  China's  largely  fixed-
membership  rural communities  and to the local  governments'  relatively  hard
budget  constraints.  Almost  irrespective  of  form  of  ownership,  there  appears  to
be a close relationship  between individual  incomes  and firm and community
economic  performance,  and  most individuals  expect  to stay in their  firms  for
relatively  long  periods  of time. In some  ways,  TVPs  are  akin to  the  so-called
"Z-firms,"  which  follow Japanese models of  labor relations and operate
successfully  in  other  market  economies.  22
The incentives  for  community  governments  to promote  TVP  development  are
extremely  strong. Where  the  opportunities  and  resources  have  been  present,  the
result  has  been  an extraordinary  burst  of rural  industrialization.  In the  more28
backward  areas  local  government  may  have  been  an obstacle  to  rural  development.
Since  the  legitimization  of private  enterprise  in the  mid-1980s,  some of the
poorer  areas  have resorted  to this  option  and  achieved  much more dynamic  TVP
growth  than  earlier.
The community orientation  of  TVPs also leads to certain problems,
resulting  from the fragmentation  of markets for capital and labor and the
multiple,  sometimes conflicting  roles of community governments.  Even if
resources are  utilized relatively  efficiently  withi  rural communities,
immobility of  factors of  production can  lead  to  increasingly  serious
misallocations  and inequalities  between  communities.  A  gradual  opening  up of
capital  and labor  markets  will  be a  priority  task  in the  next  stage  of reform.
Weakening  of  the  involvement  of  community  gcvernments  in  directly  managing  rural
industrialization  is  likely  to  be  a gradual,  long-term  process. A strengthened
legal  framework  within  which  TVCEs  and  private  firms  can  securely  operate  will
be needed.
National  governrment  policy  toward  the  TVP  sector  has  played  an important,
but essentially  passive,  role  in stimulating  TVP development. In the  future,
an important  need will  be to avoid  government  policies  and practices  that  do
major  harm to TVPs--even  more important  than  any  positive  measures  (including
allocation  of public resources)  to support  the TVP sector.  Discrimination
against TVPs and, within the TVP  sector against private enterprise,  by
government,  legal and r,.-~ulatory  apparatus  should be minimized,  with the
elimination  of  differential  treatment  as a long-term  goal.29
Ngtes
1.  The  results  of the  project  are  detailed  in  Byrd  and  Lin (1990).
2.  In  the  course  of  the  project,  five  qualitative  and  quantitative  surveys  and
numerous  interviews  were carried  out.  Data  were collected  and analyzed  on a
sample  of 122 rural  industrial  firms,  1,174  employees,  and 67 rural  townships
to  complement  aggregate  statistics  at county,  provincial,  and  national  levels.
3.  A  specialized  village  typically  contains  a  number  of firms,  some  of  which  may
be  very  small,  involved  in  common  activities,  for  example,  the  making  of  bamboo
combs,  ropemaking  or tire repair.  There  may be some institution  for common
marketing.
4. Despite  rapid  growth  of  private  firms,  by 1987  they  still  produced  only  one-
seventh  of the total  industrial  output  of the  TVP sector. Moreover,  in most
cases,  the  extent  to  which  private  firms  could  be established  and  could  grow  was
still very much determined  by  the attitude of  local government  and  its
willingness  to  permit  their  use  of  land  and  other  factors  and  to  guarantee  bank
loans.
5. Strictly  speaking,  the right to use land rather  than its ownership  was
assigned  on an individual  or  household  basis.
6.  With interest  rates  held below market-clearing  levels,  China tends to
experience  excess  demand  for funds. Rural  bank deposits  are  considered  local
resources,  and communal  governments  exert a large influence  on their use.
Nevertheless,  more industrialized  areas  such  as  Wuxi  have,  for  some  years,  been
net  borrowers  from  other  areas.
7.  Dollar  (1989)  provides  an interesting  analysis  of the  impact  of changes  in
incentives  on the  performance  of  Chinese  state-owned  enterprises  after  1978.
8.  In some  ca.';es  the  distinction  between  a community  and  a firm  may  be minor.
For  example,  e.  ceramics  factory  in one  sampled  village  employed  virtually  the
entire  labor  force  as  well  as some  outsiders.  Such  a "company  town"  is clearly
highly  vulnerable  to  market  shifts.
9. TVPs  have  also  benefited,  relative  to  state  enterprises,  from  more  favorable
tax  treatment,  although  this  advantage  is  being  eliminated.  The  effect  of  mid-
1989  policy  changes,  which  apparently  discriminate  against  TVPs  in  favor  of  state
firms,  remains  to  be seen.
10.  The  gap  system  of credit  allocation  ties  local  bank  credit  limits  to local
deposit  mobilization. This inhibits  the transfer  of final  resources  between
communities.
11. Regional  income  inequality  in  the  United  States  has  fallen  greatly  over  the
last  50  years  as  a result  of increased  interregional  mobility. For  discussion
of this  topic,  see  Barro  and  Sala  I  Martin  (1989). In  rural  China,  by  contrast,
it  has remained  high  due  to limited  mobility.30
12. For  reviava  of  public  choice  theory  see  Buchanan  (1975)  and  Mueller  (1976).
This  approach diverges from the  more  traditional  view  that  government
benevolently  designs  policies  for  society.
13.  Local  governments  are  slow  to close  loss-making  firms  partly  because  the
debts  of these  firms  represent  a fixed  cost.
14. Remittances  in  Township  A  are  mostly  out  of  enterprise  profits.  Enterprises
in  Township  B actually  made  a loss  but  were still  compelled  to remit  funds  to
the township  government.  This is characteristic  of the "fiscal  predation"
practiced  in some  poor  areas.
15.  Village  leadership  positions  are considered  to be part-time  jobs,  which
explains  this  low  base  pay.
16. Urban  registration  opens  up  access  to  cities  for  the  official  and  his  family
and  descendants  and  also  carries  with it  a package  of  benefits.
17.  A  peculiar factor contributing  to overstaffing  is the practice of
compensating  farmers  whose  land  is  lost  due  to  industrial  development  and  those
who  have  worked  on  construction  without  pay  with  lifetime  jobs  in  the  new  firms.
This  was a  particular  problem  in the  hydro  plants  of Shangrao,  where  employees
exceeded  those  necessary  to  operate  the  installations  by large  margins.
18. This  is  in  sharp  contrast,  for  example,  to  the  self-managed  enterprises  in
Yugoslavia,  which  have  some  similarities  with  the  TVPs (especially  TVCEs). The
most  important  difference  is  in  the  nature  of the  local  budget  constraint.  The
self-managed  enterprises  are  larger  and  tend  to  control  banks;  social  ownership
of  capital  further  weakens  local  accountability  in  Yugoslavia  relative  to  China
and  contributes  to  the  softening  of  local  budget  constraints.  This  has  resulted
in  poor  enterprise  performance,  deteriorated  portfolios  and  a large  deficit  in
the  captive  banking  system.
19.  Workers  do elect  their  directors  in some  Shangrao  firms;  this innovation
was introduced  in an  attempt  to lessen  the  degree  of political  interference  in
management.
20. The  term  Z-firm  was  introduced  by Ouchi  (1982)  to  describe  firms  following
Japanese patterns of  labor relations  sometimes referred to as  "lifetime
employment." In contrast,  "Taylorist"  firms follow  a "hire-and  fire"  labor
policy.31
Table  1.  TVP  Ownership  Structure  in  Four  Counties  of China,  1985
(percentage  of total  gross  industrial  output  value  of  TVPs)
Type  of  TVP  Wuxi  Nanhal  a  Jieshou  Shangrao  China
Township  fiLrs  48  43  36  43  45
Vlllage  flrms  47  31  13  22  38
Team  fLrms  2  16  - - 9
Private  firms  3  10  51  35  8
Total  3,705  1,421  127  31  175,008
(millions  of
yuan)
a.  Shares  in gross  revenues  of industrial  TVPs.
Source: Fleldwork  of World  Bank/Insitltute  of Economics  of the  Chinese  Academy  of
Social  Sciences  research  project.32
Table  2.  Selected  Indicators  of  Growth  of the  TVP Sector  in  China
1978-83  and  1983-87
(percentages)
Average  Annual  Change
Indicator  1978-83  1983-87  1978-87
Rural  industrial  output  19.7  41.5  26.4
Rural  industrial  labor  force  3.1  15.9  7.4
Fixed  assets*  15.7  26.7  20.5
Bank loans*  34.7  55.4  43.8
Profits  before  tax*  7.4  14.1  10.3
Employment  2.7  9.8  5.8
Wage  bill  15.2  24.9  19.4
Average  wage  12.1  13.7  12.9
Memorandum  items
Average  wage,  state  firms  6.1  15.6  10.2
Inflation  (CPI)  3.1  7.6  5.1
*  TVCEs  only.
Sources: State  Statistical  Bureau  of  China  (various  years);  China  Rural  Statistical
Yearbook  (various  years).33
Table  3.  Ownership  Structure  of Chinese  Industry,  Selected  Years
(percentage  of total  industrial  output  value)
Category  1971  1978  1983  1987
State  85.9  77.6  72.6  59.7
Urban  collective  10.9  13.7  14.4  14.6
Urban  individual  a  - 0.1  0.6
Urban  other  0.8  2.0
Rural  nonstate  (TVP)  3.2  8.7  12.1  23.1
Township  1.6  4.8  6.3  9.3
Village  }  }  }  8.4
)  1.6  )  3.9  )  5.8
Below  village  }  }  }  5.4
Individual  firms  3.3
a.  Includes  partnerships.
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau  of  China (various  years);  China  Rural  Statistical
Yearbook,  Statistical  Materials  on China's  Industrial  Materials  (various
years).34
Table  4.  Dispersion  of Personal  Income: Spatial  Income  Inequality
in  China  and  the  United  States,  Selected  Years
Percentage  of mean  Coefficient  of
Year  Highest  Lowest  variation  (%)a
Provinces  and states
China  urbanb  1983  137  75  13
China  rural'  1980  194  70  28
China  rural'  1985  195  62  31
United  Statesd  1981  134  72  14
United  Statesd  1986  140  70  17
Chinese  counties
Anhui  urban  1984  128  87  8
Jiangsu  urban  1985  127  85  10
Anhui  ruralt  1984  163  49  23
Jiangsu  rural'  1985  164  62  23
U.S.  states
Michigan  1981  164  60  17
Mississippi  1981  163  65  16
Oregon  1981  137  81  12
South  Dakota  1981  183  39  21
a.  Standard  deviation  divided  by mean.
b.  Average  per  capita  income  of urban  residents  in  the  capital  cities  of each  of
the  twenty-nine  provinces,  based  on  household  surveys.
c.  Average  per  capita  income  of rural  residents  in  each  province  from  household
surveys.
d.  Average  per  capita  income  by state.
e.  Average  wage  per  member  of the  urban  work force.
f.  Average  per  capita  income  for  the  rural  population.
g.  Average gross  value of agricultural  output (GVAO)  per member  of the rural
population.
Source: State  Statistical  Bureau  of China  (1985,  p. 62); (1986,  p. 202);
(1987,  p. 204);  U.S.  Government  (1983);  Washington  Post,  August
21,1987,  p. C2.  Anhui  Jingji  Nianjian  1985;  Jiangsu  Jingli  Nianlian
1986.35
Table  5.  Selected  Economic  IndLcators  in Four  Counties,  1985
(yuan  per  capita  of agricultural  population)
Indicator  Wuxi  Nanhai  Jieshou  Shangrao  China
Average  per  caplta  income  of
rural  population  754  1,029  285  322  398
Rural  gross  value  of
industrial  output  4,656  2.313  244  49  207
Gross  value  of agricultural
output  604  610  210  266  429
TVCE gross  profits  512  208  9  4  24
TVCE wage  bill  364  276  13  23  36
Note:  For  China  as  a  whole,  the  figures  are  per  member  of the  rural  population.  The
agricultural  population  is  an  administratively  defined  category  used  at local
levels,  which includes  people  engaged  in nonagricultural  activities  but not
receiving  grain  rations  or  other  subsidies.
Sources:  Information  from fieldwork  of World  Bank/Institute  of Economics  of the
Chinese  Academy  of Social  Sciences  research  project. State  Statistical
Bureau  of China  (1986).36
Table  6.  Selected  Economic  Indicators  for  Two  Townships  In  Wuxi and  Shangrao
Provinces,  China  (in  yuan)
Township  A  Township  B  Ratio
Indicator  (Wuxi,  1985)  (Shangrao,  1986)  A/B
Population  (number)  18,779  23,396  0.8
Average  per  capita  income
of rural  population  907  131  6.9
Gross  value  of sgricultural
output  per  capita  399  197  2.0
Gross  value  of industrial
output  per  capita  11,268  17  662.8
Sales  income  of township
enterprises  per  capita  5,846-  14  418.0
Local  revenue  per  capitab  1,268  9  417.6
Expenditure  per  capita  522  18  29.0
a  Industrial  enterprises  only.
b.  Includes  both  budgetary  and  nonbudgetary  revenues  but  not  additional
budgetary  funds  provided  by the  county  for  quota  budget  expenditures.
Source: Fieldwork  of World  Bank/Institute  of Economics  of the  Chinese  Academy  of
Social  Sciences  research  proJect.37
Table  7.  Government  Income  and  Expenditure  in  Two  Townships  in  Wuxi  and  Shangrao
Provinces,  China
Township  A  Township  B
(Wuxi,  1985)  (Shanarao.  1986)
Income/  Yuan  Percent  of  Yuan  Percent  of
Expenditures  (thousands)  total  (thousands)  total
Income
Tax  revenues  13,428  56.4  193.5  46.4
Less  remitted  to
county  12,978  54.5  1.7  0.4
Retained  450  1.9  191.8  46.1
Refund  from  county  - 209.8  50.4
Remittances  by township
enterprises  10,390  43.6  13.2&  3.2
Less  remitted  to
county  1,035  4.4
Total  resources  9  805  100.0  i14.8  i00.0
Expenditures
Investment  in township
enterprises  6,720  68.5  19 . 3b  4.6
Support  to agriculture  900  9.2  26.0  6.3
Public  and  social  services  1,050  10.7  285.7  68.9
Administrative
expenditures  138  1.4  70.8  17.1
Unidentified  (residual)'  1,097  11.2  13.0  3.1
Total  expenditures'  9,805  100.0  414.8  100.0
--  not  available.
a. Township  B's enterprises  had net losses  totaling  Y13,759 in 1986.  These
remittances  were financed  by additional  bank borrowing  and by drawing from
depreciation  allowances.
b. It is assumed  that  all  budgetary  expenditure  'in  support  of production'  other
than items clearly specified  as agricultural  was for investment  in township
enterprises.
c. Total  expenditures  are assumed  to  be exactly  equal  to total  township  revenue
resources,  with the  unidentified  portion  of expenditures  derived  as  a residual.
Source: Fieldwork  of World  Bank/Institute  of Economics  of the  Chinese  Academy  of
Social  Sciences  research  project.38
Table  8.  Original  Homes  of Employees  in  Sample  TVP  Enterprises  in  China,  by County
(percentage  of total)
Sa.  township/  Other  township/  Other  county  Other
County  village  village  in  county
Wuxi  94.0  3.0  1.6  1.4
Ji,shou  79.7  12.7  4.8  2.8
Nanhai  50.9  33.8  14.2  1.1
Shangrao  80.9  14.8  2.1  2.2
Source: Meng  Xin (1990).39
Table  9.  Recruitment  of  Workers  in  Sample  Rural  Enterprises  in  China  by Selected
Categories  (number  of  workers)
Category  Allocation  Voluntary  Total
By county
Wuxi  270  191  461
Jieshou  84  209  293
Nanhai  99  154  253
Shangrao  78  66  144
Total  531  620  1,151
By age
Under  20  40  114  153
20-29  233  320  554
30-39  168  117  258
40-49  71  57  128
50+  19  12  31
Total  531  620  1,151
By  ownership
Public  398  380  778
Private  33  111  144
Total  431  491  922
By pay (yuan  per  year)
Less  than  625  82  180  262
625-1,249  180  263  475
1,250-2,499  173  142  315
2,500-4,999  44  31  75
Total  531  620  1,151
Notes:  Chi  square  - 73.4  for  counties,  54.9  for  age, 38.9  for  ownership,  and 51.5
for  pay.  In all  cases,  these  are  significant  at  0.1  percent.
Source: Fieldwork  of World  Bank/Institute  of Economics  of the  Chinese  Academy  of
Social  Sciences  research  project.40
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